Intro
I'm reading "Puzzels of Reference" by Herman Cappelen & Josh Dever, and I have some remarks about it.
Chapter 2: A Puzzle about Belief, Reference, and Agency
The chapter is about two names that refer to the same entity, but at the same time seem to refer to two different entities.
Examples:
- Marilyn Monroe and Norma Mortenson
- Clark Kent and Superman
Why is it that you can't just replace "Norma Mortenson" for "Marilyn Monroe" in the sentence
Jill just discovered that Marilyn Monroe is Norma Mortenson
It surprises me that the book doesn't even name the distinction between sense and reference that was created by Frege. They must know about it. Frege gives as example the Morning Star and Evening Star that both refer to the planet Venus.
So the answer to the puzzle is that Marilyn Monroe and Norma Mortenson are two names of senses, that have the same referent. The sense of a name is
the thought it expresses.
The authors come closest to this option in their "believing under a guise", but it's much less clear than the sense solution.
To stay with Kripke's Causal-Communicative Model, you might say that if there are two senses to a name, that there are not one, but two causal chains from name to referent.
Postscript 1:
About the sentence: "Clark Kent is Superman", what does it mean? If it would mean that they are identical, you should be able to replace one name by the next. Also it proves hard to implement such identity in a system. I came up with this idea: "Clark Kent is Superman" should be compared to sentences as "Clark Kent is male". Element belongs to set. To be precise: the entity named "Clark Kent" belongs to the set of entities named "Superman".
Postscript 2:
Superman has been seen taking gold and gems from a jewelry store.
What would be the meaning of "Superman" in this sentence? The sense of "Superman" here is the real Superman (the thought it expresses is that it is really Superman), but the referent is the thief. The causal chain takes a twist after the sense.
Postscript 3:
Elon Musk changed Twitter into X.
Are Twitter and X two names for the same entity? Are they still the same thing? If not, what about the Morning Star and the Evening Star? Don't they have different characteristics? What does it mean they are the same, really? Is it the physical aspect? What about Superman and Clark Kent, are they fictionally physically the same? What about the caterpillar and the butterfly? Are they the same? Is it the individual? What about the tree trunk that's turned into a boat?
Old Man Oak was chopped down and turned into an oak. Now he spent his time transporting small Indians to the other shore.
Old Man Oak was chopped down and turned into millions of tiny matches. Now he spent his time lighting candles and starting furnace fires.
Isn't identity just a man-made concept that is just as fluent as every other?
To say that sense S1 and S2 are the same, means that they have the same referent. Is that important? For a computer system? Only if there is a distinction between the sense layer and the referent layer. Most systems just have one layer. Is this the sense layer or the referent layer? Is the name of a customer in a database the sense of the person or the referent? It's usually taken to represent the referent. But we could also agree that the database is about senses. It depends on the application. However to represent the sentence "Clark Kent is Superman" in a database, we must not only represent Clark Kent and Superman as entities in the database, but also a third, more abstract entity $9822811. Only then we can say:
name($797483, "Clark Kent")
name($188294, "Superman")
referent($797483, $9822811)
referent($188294, $9822811)
and this would then represent the sentence
Clark Kent is Superman
Postscript 4:
I now think a name has a meaning, a subjective referent and an collective referent. And that none of these are required.
The meaning is defined by a logical expression. So this is different from the sense of Frege, which is just a thought, and thus individual to a person.
The referent is the entity the name refers to. One can hold that the referent can't be fictional, but to me this is just a matter of choice, and we could just as well agree that fictional entities can be referents.
A subjective referent is the entity that an individual means by a name. A collective referent is what's meant by the name in general. Usually they are the same, of course.
Some examples:
- No meaning, only referent: Proper names like John McCarthy
- No referent, only meaning: Jack the Ripper (before we knew who it was; well there always was the subjective referent of the murderer himself)
- Both meaning and referent: The Morning Star (meaning: seen in the eastern sky before or at sunrise), Superman (meaning: the guy with the cape and the letter S on his chest), Octavianus (meaning: before 27 BC)
- No meaning, no referent: Jabberwocky
Octavianus was later called Augustus, so when we name the man we must take into account the time of the event. Same for Cassius Clay / Muhammad Ali.
Postscript 5:
There's also a solution of this problem possible that I would call the cognitive variant. It would say that a referent is just a theoretical construct that has no basis in the human mind and no relevance to ordinary communication.
To a human, a name belongs to an idea. John McCarthy is an idea, and so is Superman and Jabberwocky. It's a mental entity with a name and possibly associated with perceptions and knowledge.
Leaving referents to scientists and logicians, we continue with just ideas. Can we solve all our problems with them?
Clark Kent is Superman: this means: there exists a two-way relationship between CK and S that inherits information from the other idea. Starting out with two ideas, Clark Kent and Superman, we learn that they are the same thing. At that point we form a mental connection between the two ideas, the connection is-a. This connection is an active connection. Now, whenever we need information about Clark Kent, and we don't find it, we also make a deduction: since Superman is-a Clark Kent, we can also take this information from him. It also works the other way. It may be called two-way prototypical inheritance.
Superman has been seen taking gold and gems from a jewelry store: this is not problematic at all: the idea of Superman in the minds of the newspaper readers is just extended with an extra, be it shocking, event. There is no referent in the mind, so there's no problem either.
After 27BC, Octavius was called Augustus: with the new name, Augustus, we also create a new entity. Everything we knew about Octavius is copied to the new entity. And we create the relation is. We may be able to do a shallow copy, which means that we don't actually copy anything, but when something changes in one entity, it won't change in the other entity.
So, is a name a causal chain (Kripke) or a description (Frege)? Well, there is a chain of ideas, but it doesn't end in the referent. It ends with the first person that had the idea. And there are also descriptions of ideas, but they don't describe the idea uniquely, and there may be many descriptions for the same idea.
An idea may be linked to a perception. And we form an idea based on our perception or on our thoughts. And we give this idea a name, to make it easier to talk about. This is the origin of the name, but it's one step away of the real referent, which is the object or person we perceived. But referents are problematic. Does a rainbow have a referent? It has no objective existence. Does that matter? Only when you're interested in objective existence.
Postscript 6
People use constructs to think. Constructs may be real, which means that they have a substrate in physical reality, or fictional.
The relationship between a construct and reality is an informational relation, no other connection exists. This relation is neither physical, nor imaginary, but exists nevertheless.
A construct can be an entity or a statement or relation about multiple entities.
A name is an attribute of a construct.
A construct refers to an entity. I think we must let go of the idea that a referent must be real. The entity may be real or fictional. A real entity has a physical substrate. A fictional entity has a mental substrate (it exists in the imagination of people).
The truth of a real construct should be found in reality. Only reality determines the truth value of a real construct.
The truth of a fictional construct is decided by the author of the entity. Only J.K. Rowling may decide what happens next to Harry Potter.
The identification of constructs (i.e. "Clark Kent is Superman") doesn't change the relationship between the constructs and the object in reality/imagination, because this relationship is purely informational, and it already existed. Instead, both constructs are extended with an equals relationship. This relationship can be used in deductions about the constructs from that moment on ("Since Clark Kent is Superman, Clark Kent was in London when Superman met his nemesis").
Chapter 3: A Puzzle about Referring to What Isn't There
The chapter is about names like "Sherlock Holmes". Sherlock Holmes doesn't exist, and so how can you refer to him?
Well, existence (reality) is contrasted with fiction. So you can't refer to the real Sherlock Holmes, but you can still refer to the fictional Sherlock Holmes. And anything you say about Sherlock Holmes can have a truth value in the fictional world:
- Sherlock Holmes lived at 221B Baker Street (true)
- Sherlock Holmes doesn't exist (true)
- Sherlock Holmes is a detective (true)
- Sherlock Holmes was first introduced in A Study in Scarlet (true)
- Sherlock Holmes was a fictional character who was the basis for the television character Gregory House (I have no idea, but whatever)
In "Sherlock Holmes is a detective" the word "is" is a copula, that has no relation to existence.
In "Sherlock Holmes lived at 221B Baker Street", living seems to presuppose existence, but it is simply a very creative verb. "the living planet", "his ideas are still very much alive", "the life cycle of software components".
The book gives us 3 "Realist Views" (that claim that these names refer). Of these "Creationism" comes close to what I think is the case: "N-names refer to fictional characters". But then the book says "Because Sherlock Holmes is an abstract entity created by human activity, Sherlock Holmes is not a detective. Detectives are concrete, not abstract." Which sounds logical, but as abstract is simply another word for fictional in this paragraph, it flatly denies exactly what I am trying to propose, without reason. Then follows the odd claim that "creationists" don't believe in their own stance: "Creationists take typical in-fiction claims to be false."
The puzzle can simply be solved by allowing references to be about fictional entities. A thought that's simply unacceptable to the authors, it seems.
The reason for this probably goes back to Frege, who made reference about existing entities, because he aimed at scientific truths and reasoning. However, in the common use of language, references can very well be about fictional entities.